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ABSTRACT: In controversial science-intensive policy debates, charges of expert bias often arise. How does one 
sort out such charges—especially when expertise is interdisciplinary and collaborative? In this paper I address the 
problem of collaborative expert bias at the level of group process. Identification of bias is complicated not only by 
interdisciplinary complexity, but also by the ubiquity of bias, some of which can be fruitful for scientific 
discovery. Drawing on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for illustration, I distinguish 
different kinds of group-level bias in the sciences and propose ways of identifying bad bias. 
KEYWORDS: bias, expertise, collaboration, climate change, IPCC. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When scientific experts find themselves entangled in controversial policy debates, charges of 
bias often arise. How does one sort out such charges—especially when expertise is 
interdisciplinary and collaborative? In such cases, the alleged bias often operates at the group 
level. The idea of group bias is hardly new. A substantial literature on group bias now 
encompasses a range of disciplines and approaches, including cognitive and social psychology, 
feminism, and science studies. Nonetheless, treatments of bias by informal logicians and 
critical thinking scholars have focused mainly on bias as a problem for individual arguers. To 
be sure, scholars of argument have long recognized how group membership can bias an arguer 
in a particular direction. But the “bearer” of bias remains the individual. Policy-relevant 
expertise raises the question of bias at the level of the group itself. 
 This paper addresses the problem of collaborative expert bias in contexts that meet 
three conditions: (i) a group of experts deliver advice on policy-relevant natural-scientific or 
health questions that admit of objectively correct and incorrect answers; (ii) reliable answers to 
such questions require the input of multiple scientific disciplines; (iii) the alleged bias at issue 
lies at the level of group process. Assessing group-level bias charges becomes especially 
important in such contexts, given that complex collaborative expert arguments outstrip the 
competence of any single person to assess. Thus our confidence in the quality of expert advice 
rests largely on the quality of the process itself.  
 But how should we make that assessment, given the ubiquity of bias and complexity 
of technical content? For bias occurs in different forms, and not all bias is bad. After some 
initial orientation, I distinguish two kinds of group-level bias (secs. 2, 3). I then describe two 
apparently ubiquitous biases in science: confirmation bias and “preference” bias. Because these 
can be fruitful for research, it is important to develop criteria for sorting good from bad cases 
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(sec. 4). To illustrate these issues, I refer throughout to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), and I close with a particular bias charge against that panel (sec. 5).  
2. ORIENTATION 
The literature on group bias is both sizable and multi-disciplinary, and so some initial sorting is 
necessary to delimit the scope of my analysis. Notice first the difference between two uses of 
the word “bias,” which we might label “technical” and “partisan” (cf. Walton, 1999, p. 224ff). 
In some fields the “bias” label refers to technical probabilistic and statistical errors of 
reasoning. Statistical biases involve errors in data sampling. Cognitive psychologists use the 
term “cognitive bias” for certain types of widespread errors in human reasoning, such as the 
“base-rate fallacy,” and errors in conditional reasoning (Evans & Over, 1996). Statistical and 
cognitive biases reflect tendencies in human cognition that make certain kinds of technical 
mistakes likely. Understood merely as a tendency to mistaken reasoning, or as the mistake 
itself, such biases do not stem from a flawed character or a partisan commitment to defending 
one’s position at all costs. In this paper I am not so concerned with basic technical mistakes, as 
with bias in the partisan sense. (To be sure, a partisan bias in disposition can lead to sloppy 
reasoning, thus to technical biases in content.) 
 Whereas technical bias appears primarily in the content of an argument, partisan bias 
can appear in both content and process. At the level of content, Douglas Walton defines 
partisan bias “simply as a one-sided argument—an argument that lacks the balance necessary 
for it to be two-sided” (Walton, 1999, p. 76). This definition is helpful for its breadth, 
capturing a wide range of cases of bias. Indeed, partisanship implies a kind of lack of balance, 
which might or might not be appropriate. In agonistic settings, such as law courts, we expect 
each side to produce an unbalanced argument for its position. Balance is achieved through the 
division of labor. Thus a biased argument is not necessarily a bad argument in context. 
 The level of process potentially includes everything in the social context that affects 
the quality of argument-making: the participants’ background and dispositions, the formal and 
informal procedures they employ, how their personalities interact, the institutional setting, and 
so on. I am concerned here with group settings, more precisely with “transactional contexts,” 
that is, the contexts in which members of a group are engaged in person-to-person exchange of 
arguments. For present purposes, two main aspects of transactional contexts are crucial for the 
analysis of bias: the participants’ dispositions and the structure of their transaction.  
 The literature on bias tends to identify partisan bias in process with the arguer’s 
disposition. Insofar as argument-making presupposes a personal disposition to favor one 
position over another, hence a kind of partisanship, argumentation seems to require bias. To 
that extent, we may regard bias as normal or good (Blair, 1988). Walton concurs: “Bias or 
dialectical slanting in argumentation . . . is not inherently bad”; rather, “if you equate it with 
advocacy, partisanship, or point of view in argumentation, it may be, in many instances, a good 
thing” (Walton, 1999, p. xviii). Bad bias occurs when the commitment necessary to engaged 
argument-making undermines the quality of the transaction or the argument content in context. 
Although one might associate bias with the arguer’s close-mindedness or lack of impartiality, 
in some contexts these do not undermine the transactional goal. Thus, a public debate between 
two close-minded opponents might prove helpful for an audience trying to make up its mind.  
 
ASSESSING BIAS CHARGES 
 
327 
3. GROUP-LEVEL PROCESS BIASES 
At the group level we can identity distinctively group-level dispositions and procedures as 
potential sources of bias. To my knowledge, neither of these has received much attention from 
argumentation theorists. 
3.1 Group Dispositions 
The prime example of a group-level disposition in the psychological sense is “groupthink.” 
This phenomenon, identified by Irving Janis (1972), has received considerable attention from 
social psychologists, though doubts remain about its empirical support, scope, and usefulness 
as an explanatory model (Esser, 1998; Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). According to Baron’s 
“ubiquity model,” however, groupthink symptoms—suppression of dissent in groups, tendency 
to conformity (polarization of attitudes in a group), self-censorship, and the illusion of 
consensus—typically arise in groups that meet three antecedent conditions: members identify 
with their group; group discussion gives rise to attitudes that have a normative character for 
members; and the “situational self-efficacy” of individual members—their confidence in 
dealing with group tasks effectively—is low (Baron, 2005, pp. 238–244).  
 Groupthink presents a potentially serious problem in science. Scientific specialties 
exhibit at least two of Baron’s antecedent conditions. Both empirically informed social studies 
of science, as well as research on collective intentionality, suggest that (a) scientific 
cooperation depends on some level of group identification (understanding oneself as a 
competent member of a discipline), and (b) scientific discussion presupposes and generates 
empirical and theoretical results that count as normative standards for competent reasoning.1 
When the group faces problems that exhibit the daunting complexity of climate science, we 
might expect the third condition to appear as well, low situational self-efficacy.  
 As it turns out, recent IPCC procedural revisions reveal a concern for groupthink in 
author teams: 
Be aware of a tendency for a group to converge on an expressed view and become overconfident in 
it. Views and estimates can also become anchored on previous versions or values to a greater extent 
than is justified. One possible way to avoid this would be to ask each member of the author team to 
write down his or her individual assessments of the level of uncertainty before entering into a group 
discussion. If this is not done before group discussion, important views may be inadequately 
discussed and assessed ranges of uncertainty may be overly narrow. Recognize when individual 
views are adjusting as a result of group interactions and allow adequate time for such changes in 
viewpoint to be reviewed. (IPCC, 2010, Appendix 4, Treatment of Uncertainty, no. 3, draft) 
This statement responds to recommendations from the InterAcademy Council (IAC, 2010) 
regarding the estimation of uncertainty—more on which below. 
3.2 Procedures 
In considering group-level sources of expert bias, we must also look to the design and 
execution of committee procedures. Agencies responsible for expert advice pay close attention 
                                                
1 For relevant work in the social studies of science, see Kuhn (1996); Ziman (1968); for worries about 
groupthink based on collective intentionality, see Tollefsen (2006). 
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to committee procedures, whose design and psychology is now the subject of a growing 
empirical literature (e.g., Bijker, Bal, & Hendriks, 2009; Hilgartner, 2000; Jasanoff, 2005). 
What we want, presumably, are committees that  
• do not dissolve into contention but reach robust conclusions,  
• which are scientifically accurate or reliable,  
• sufficiently clear to guide policymakers (rather than so hedged with second-guessing 
as to provide no support for decisions),  
• democratically accountable,  
• yet not unduly politicized.2 
Behind the last condition lies the idea that reliable science for policy should not substantively 
depend on political partisanship, though it might have partisan political implications. After all, 
the natural and health sciences—my focus in this paper—reach conclusions about an objective 
reality, knowledge of which is independent of partisan allegiance, right? 
 Not quite. In the health sciences, conclusions can hardly avoid cultural assumptions 
about human well-being. Even when dealing with the non-human world, descriptive categories 
and risk estimates often involve cultural values; when such values are controversial, 
politicization is practically unavoidable (Pielke, 2007). In such contexts, we do better to 
understand “unduly politicized” conclusions as conclusions that do not suffer from bad bias—
committee dispositions and procedures foster a balanced assessment of the available science, 
which takes into account different cultural perspectives and values as appropriate. For that to 
occur, process designs must succeed in combining rigorous technical analysis with deliberative 
forums that include the full range of stakeholders, expert and lay.3 
 In any case, bad procedural biases can arise in a number of ways, all of which involve 
a lack of appropriate balance in committee deliberation. A committee might lack representation 
from relevant disciplines for the policy-relevant topic. Or it might lack the wider sources of 
input for reflecting on social and moral values that condition scientific reasoning and judgment 
at different points (Douglas, 2009).  
 IPCC procedures incorporate a number of mechanisms that foster wider input and 
deliberation. The IPCC is designed to include not only all the relevant disciplines but also 
scientists from different regions of the world. Moreover, government representatives as well as 
other stakeholders (business interests, NGOs, etc.) are involved at certain stages of the multi-
step report process. That process begins with the selection of authors and determination of 
report scope; moves through the various stages of drafting, reviewing, and revising of reports; 
and concludes with plenary sessions in which reports are finally accepted, which is to say: 
accepted both by scientists and governments (see IPCC, 2008; Bolin, 2007). 
 
                                                
2 This list expands on Douglas (2009), p. 134; for a history of science advising, see Douglas (2009), chaps. 2, 7–
8. 
3 On the analytic-deliberative approach to science advising, see Douglas (2009), chap. 8; note that inclusion 
need not require sunshine rules for all expert discussion in committee; see Rehg (2009), chap. 8; Bijker et al., 
(2009). 
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4. BIASES INHERENT IN SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENTATION 
We should not be surprised if scientific argumentation, like argumentation in general, is 
inherently biased in certain ways. Here I examine two such biases: confirmation bias and 
“preference bias.” These appear ubiquitous, but they are not always bad. Consequently, critical 
assessment of scientific bias requires an eye for the bad cases. Both have their most obvious 
source in dispositions, but at the group level they can also arise through flawed procedures. 
4.1 Confirmation Bias.  
Psychological research shows that human beings are inherently prone to favor considerations 
and evidence that support their position, and to disregard or discount counter-evidence 
(Mercier & Sperber, 2011; for doubts, see Evans & Over, 1996, pp. 103–109). Up to a point, 
this kind of bias might be fruitful for scientific discovery. As critics of Popper’s 
falsificationism have pointed out, great discoveries can require perseverance in the face of 
apparently contrary evidence. To put it in Kuhn’s terms, good science requires an ability to live 
with a certain level of “anomalies” in one’s approach, on the assumption that one will 
eventually be able to resolve inconsistencies between one’s hypothesis and other 
considerations. Contrary empirical measurements, for example, may simply prove mistaken or 
insufficiently accurate. Confirmation bias is bad, however, when it leads a researcher to cling 
to a favored hypothesis beyond all reason, or even worse, when it becomes so channeled and 
rampant in the community that progress falters.  
 Mercier and Sperber (2011) suggest that confirmation bias has an evolutionary basis. 
If human reasoning evolved for its use in social processes of argumentation, then we should 
not be surprised by widespread confirmation bias in individual reasoning. Though often a 
weakness at the individual level, confirmation bias can strengthen social argument-making 
inasmuch as (a) each participant strives to convince others by putting forward the best case for 
his or her own argument, but (b) by doing this together, participants provide a natural check 
against each other’s confirmation bias.  
 As with bias in general, then, context matters in distinguishing good from bad 
confirmation bias. This is especially true for policy-relevant expertise. Because expert 
knowledge confers confidence in one’s judgments, expertise can actually accentuate 
confirmation bias (Mercier, 2011). Even if such confidence can foster discovery in research 
contexts, it poses a serious problem in policy contexts. Experts, after all, are charged with 
assessing the overall state of the literature, not pursuing their own research agenda. Thus 
committee venues are especially important for countering such bias. To do so, the committee 
must be sufficiently heterogeneous with respect to viewpoints on the issue at hand. Thus 
composition of the committee and the provision for outside review play important roles in 
countering confirmation bias. At least at first glance, the size of author teams responsible for 
IPCC chapters, along with review procedures, should provide some check on expert 
confirmation bias at the level of individual reasoning. 
4.2 Preference (Inductive-risk) Bias  
Torsten Wilholt (2009) has argued that “preference bias” is ubiquitous in scientific research. 
Preference bias “occurs when a research result unduly reflects the researchers’ preference for it 
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over other possible results” (Wilholt, 2009, p. 92). Thus defined, preference bias coincides 
with bad partisan bias in general. However, Wilholt is after something more specific: the kind 
of bias that involves “tampering with the balance of inductive risk” (2009, p. 94). Thus the 
more accurate term is “inductive-risk bias.” 
 In testing hypotheses, scientists must make value-laden judgments about the relative 
costs of two kinds of error: not accepting true hypotheses, and accepting false hypotheses. The 
widely used 95% confidence level reflects a risk-averse valuation: one would prefer to delay 
acceptance of a true hypothesis rather than advance a false claim. Decisions that flow from 
such value-judgments have consequences, not only for the researcher’s career, but in some 
cases for groups affected by the social consequences of the decision—for example, the delay of 
new treatments for the critically ill. But, Wilholt maintains, there is no principled yet feasible 
method for impartially balancing the costs and risks involved in the two kinds of error. The 
reason is that we cannot distinguish honest disagreement in judgments of value from genuinely 
bad bias. Inductive-risk bias, then, is both ubiquitous and ambiguous—it “will simply be part 
of the scientific condition” (Wilholt, 2009, p. 95; also Douglas, 2009). 
 Inductive-risk bias can arise at various stages of research: in experimental design, 
interpretation of data, and communication of results. Biased experimental design, for example, 
makes it less likely that one will falsify one’s favored hypothesis. Bias can affect interpretation 
of data in various ways, such as through one’s choice of statistical standards for rejecting data. 
Some feminist critiques of masculinist bias in science lie at this level (e.g., Longino, 1990). 
Finally, publication bias is an example of inductive-risk bias that affects communication of 
results. Publication bias arises from the fact that researchers and journals systematically prefer 
positive findings over research that fails to confirm a hypothesis. For example, if climate-
journal editors believe the social-environmental risks of underestimating the effects of climate 
change are greater than the risks of overestimation, they might preferentially publish studies 
that confirm the threats of climate change. Climate change skeptics have charged climate 
science with such bias. But without a record of high-quality unpublished findings, the charge is 
speculative at best (for a reply to skeptics, see Nordhaus, 2012). 
 Drawing on social epistemology, Wilholt identifies disciplinary conventions as one 
solution to the problems posed by the ambiguity of inductive-risk bias. The key problem lies in 
the corrosion of trust necessary for fruitful scientific collaboration. Scientific practices heavily 
depend on the mutual trust scientists place in their peer-reviewed arguments. Conventional 
standards in effect remove some judgments about inductive risk from the individual’s purview. 
The result is a better coordination in the normative standards scientists use in evaluating 
results. Insofar as their papers adhere to conventional standards of experimental design, 
confidence levels, and interpretation, differences in individuals’ judgments about the value of 
this or that hypothesis and relative costs of error have less effect on results, and epistemic trust 
is preserved across the community. And insofar as unpublished negative research findings are 
made available for scrutiny (as in some medical fields), suspicions of publication bias can be 
confirmed or rejected (Wilholt, 2009, p. 97). This analysis leads Wilholt to a usable concept of 
inductive-risk bias: “the infringement of an explicit or implicit conventional standard of the 
respective research community in order to increase the likelihood of arriving at a preferred 
result” (2009, p. 99).  
 Nonetheless, context matters here too. Inductive-risk bias is not necessarily bad, 
inasmuch as different risk preferences in the community can feed competing research programs 
and therewith the exploration of more avenues of discovery. But expert committees pose 
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distinctive challenges. Similar to scientists’ use of conventional research standards, expert 
committees, the IPCC included, develop their reports using procedures that are supposed to 
foster the audience’s trust in the report content (Hilgartner, 2000). Unlike research standards, 
however, committee procedures are not designed simply to coordinate practices across a 
discipline by removing value-judgments from individual discretion. Here the difference 
between long-term and short-term timeframes is decisive. As long as members of a discipline 
follow the same conventions, whether those conventions favor risk-taking or risk-averse 
strategies is less important than the fact that they do not squelch discovery and correction of 
error over time. In science advising, a genuinely impartial balance between risk and caution 
becomes crucial for the trustworthiness of policy-relevant advice, which is inherently value-
laden and thus potentially politically contentious. Consequently, expert procedures must reflect 
such impartiality, both in the estimation of technical uncertainties and in their responsiveness 
to democratically accountable deliberation over the relevant values.  
 I thus suggest that bad inductive-risk bias in science advising occurs when an expert 
committee infringes publicly accepted, democratically accountable guidelines for assessing 
relevant literature, estimating uncertainties, and characterizing risk in an impartial manner. 
Note that this definition does not depend on any attribution of suspect motives to committee 
members; the bias might involve such dispositions, but it can also arise from unintentional 
procedural violations. Adequate procedures must ensure both technical reliability and, at some 
level, democratic accountability—demands that federal agencies and lawmakers have 
recognized for some time now (Douglas, 2009, chap. 7).  
5. BIAS IN THE IPCC 
I close by applying the above analysis to an actual bias charge against the IPCC. Critics have 
leveled a range of bias charges against the IPCC: ignoring relevant literature; groupthink; 
political bias; and publication bias in climate science as a whole (resp., Pielke & Staley, 2007; 
Lemonick, 2010; Horner, 2007; Michaels & Balling, 2009, chap. 7). Given the inclusive, 
multi-stage design of IPCC report-writing procedures, bias charges face a significant burden of 
proof. In general, a strong bias charge combines multiple indicators of possible bias (Rehg, 
2011, pp. 396–397). In the case of the IPCC, the stronger charges link (1) technical problems 
in report content, (2) flaws in procedures or their execution, and (3) evidence of close-
mindedness.  
 Judith Curry, an active climate researcher, has issued a string of criticisms of the 
IPCC that link these elements (see Lemonick, 2010; Curry, 2010; Curry, n.d.). What makes her 
critique interesting for my purposes is her suggested tie between the IPCC’s problematic 
uncertainty estimates and groupthink bias, more precisely a defensive mentality in the IPCC 
that cuts off potentially fruitful dialogue with more responsible critics. This charge fits with the 
contents of the purloined emails of some IPCC scientists, whose remarks indeed display a 
certain defensiveness (Powell, 2011, chap. 14). Moreover, the IPCC apparently meets the 
antecedent conditions that make groupthink likely, and both IPCC scientists and critics have 
concerns about procedural flaws (see IAC, 2010; Hulme, Zorita, Stocker, Price, & Christy, 
2010). So we should not simply dismiss Curry’s critique. 
 But we should hesitate before accepting Curry’s defensiveness charge. The IPCC 
procedural revisions reflect a concern not with defensiveness, but with factual errors and group 
dynamics that engender a kind of team-level confirmation bias. Nor is it clear that IPCC 
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scientists are defensive about their process. Besides accepting certain IAC recommendations 
(IPCC, 2010), IPCC scientists have engaged criticisms online (at realclimate.org), and have 
publicly entertained a range of structural revisions to the IPCC (Hulme et al., 2010).  
 What is more, both Curry’s technical objections about uncertainty and her 
defensiveness charge fall under the ambiguous category of inductive-risk bias. We should thus 
ask, first, to what extent the technical objections simply express different value-judgments of 
the costs of different kinds of error. This question lies at the heart of the political controversy 
over climate projections. Before we can connect uncertainty estimates with bad bias, we must 
clarify the values that underlie competing assessments of the possible impacts of climate 
change and response strategies on the economy, environment, and public health. 
 Second, we should ask to what extent the defensiveness charge boils down to an 
honest disagreement over the merits of two transactional strategies. Some of Curry’s own 
remarks support this reading: 
There seems to be some sort of unwritten rule by the IPCC scientists and their defenders not to 
engage with critics/skeptics, since they think that such engagement legitimizes the skeptics. 
Personally, I think that the almost total lack of “mainstream” climate scientists engaging with 
skeptics has resulted in a loss of the moral high ground in the public’s view, and has acted to 
increase the public credibility of the skeptics. (2010) 
At this point we do not have a straightforward bias charge, but a genuine dispute over 
transactional merits. At issue are the proper conduct of science advisory panels and their mode 
of public engagement.  
 More precisely, we have two procedural alternatives—engaging critics/skeptics more 
widely or more narrowly—that incorporate different value-judgments about the costs of 
different kinds of error. As some analysts have pointed out, opening modeling data to critical 
scrutiny can assist in the correction of errors (Edwards, 2010, pp. 421–427). However, too 
wide an engagement with skeptics can retard argument-making—in effect, one raises the bar 
on acceptable conclusions, similar to raising the confidence level for acceptable hypotheses. If 
one judges the risks of inaction as the more serious (compared to the risk of unnecessarily 
aggressive measures), then a more controlled admission of criticism has some justification. 
 The narrower strategy has its roots in the history of climate-change skepticism, whose 
ties to business interests are well-documented (e.g., Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Lahsen, 2008). 
I think the record shows that the IPCC did not initially dismiss industry-sponsored and 
libertarian skeptics; rather, scientists were unconvinced by skeptical doubts, and as typically 
happens in science, unconvinced scientists eventually stop listening to holdouts. The field 
moves on, presuming that the truth will prove itself at the level of practice, in the comparative 
fruitfulness of competing research programs. The failure of skeptics to display the appropriate 
ethos of scientific argumentation only hastened their dismissal: many of them lacked 
credentials in climate science, and others argued in a way that points to bad faith (see Oreskes 
& Conway, 2010). Moreover, skeptics often tend to repeat old objections to climate science, 
but without any mention of the strong rebuttals on record.4 These ethotic failures partly stem 
from differences between the ethoi of political and scientific argumentation. Because politics, 
more than science, is characterized by mistrust, stricter adherence to predetermined procedures 
becomes crucial to legitimate outcomes, something IPCC scientists did not seem fully to 
                                                
4 I have noticed this in my own research on the history of the controversy; I also draw here on conversations 
with a climate scientist, Benjamin de Foy. But see also Powell (2011). 
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appreciate (see Edwards & Schneider, 2001); In addition, the self-expressive character of 
political argument allows losing parties to repeat their position far longer than would be 
appropriate in science.  
 In support of the more open approach, Curry points out that climate-change 
skepticism has evolved over the last decade from industry-sponsored attacks to decentered, 
blog-based challenges that do not stem from special interests (Curry, n.d.). Thus climate 
scientists’ wariness toward outsider critique no longer obviously holds. There may be 
advantages, both for the public credibility of climate science and for its technical merits, in 
developing some wider venues of public engagement that could positively interact with expert 
forums such as the IPCC.  
 However one settles this question of procedure, one should do so in the honest 
recognition that in the United States, the skeptics have won the rhetorical contest over 
inductive-risk bias, for they have cast sufficient doubt on the impartiality of IPCC process to 
undermine trust where it matters most: in the halls of Congress and in the portion of the 
population that supports skeptical legislators. In winning this victory, skeptics were assisted by 
well-publicized infringements of IPCC procedures designed to safeguard impartiality. It is time 
for public reflection on how to improve the communicative dimensions of IPCC process. 
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